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Defendant/Appellant Glen C. Pickett ("Pickett"), by and through counsel, hereby 
objects to Plaintiff7Appellees', Daniel Armstrong's, Jared Armstrong's and Taylor 
Armstrong's (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Armstrongs") Statement of Facts 
and submit their Reply Brief as set forth below. 
OBJECTION TO THE ARMSTRONGS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While the Heading in the Armstrongs' Brief states that it contains relevant facts with 
citations to the record, several of the facts set forth therein are irrelevant to the issues on 
appeal and appear to be inserted for inflammatory purposes. Furthermore, several of the 
facts included in the Armstrongs' Brief simply restate the trial court's factual findings that 
are on appeal for lack of evidentiary support. Those facts should not be given any weight by 
this Court. 
I. THE ARMSTRONGS' ARGUMENT REGARDING THE STANDARD 
OF REVIEW FOR EVIDENTIARY RULINGS FAILED TO ADDRESS 
ANY OF THE FACTUAL ISSUES IN THIS CASE 
In their first point of argument, the Armstrongs correctly identify the standard of 
review used to evaluate a trial court's evidentiary rulings and factual findings and the impact 
of harmless errors. The Armstrongs, however, fail to identify any particular factual finding, 
or evidentiary ruling that resulted in harmless error. While Point I of the Armstrongs' 
Brief may be a fair statement regarding the rule of harmless error, they have failed to apply 
the rule to the case at hand. Since Pickett's counsel and this Court are left to guess which 
errors the Armstrongs claim may be harmless, or the reasons that they may be harmless, the 
Armstrongs' first argument cannot be responded to and should be ignored. 
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H. PICKETT ADEQUATELY PRESERVED THE ISSUES THAT 
NEEDED TO BE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL 
Point II of the Armstrongs' argument contends that Pickett failed to raise several of 
the issues on appeal below. The only two issues that had to be raised below to preserve 
them for appeal, however, were: (1) whether Daniel Armstrong had standing to sue for 
damage to property he did not own; and (2) whether the PIP threshold requirement set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l) had to be met before the Armstrongs, individually, 
could pursue claims for general damages.1 The other issues on appeal are factual issues 
which can be raised at any time in this case because the trial court was the fact finder. 
A. Pickett Was Not Required to Raise His Objections to the Trial 
Court's Factual Findings in Order to Appeal Them 
The Armstrongs' Brief claims that Pickett cannot challenge the Proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (R. 567), on appeal because his objection below does not 
meet the standard set forth in Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997) (holding issues must be brought to a level of consciousness before the trial 
court to afford it an opportunity to make a ruling). Pickett's challenges to the trial court's 
factual findings in this case, however, are governed by Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b). It states in 
part: 
When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, 
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may 
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in 
the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to 
amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
JBoth issues will be dealt with separately below. 
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This case was tried to the court without a jury. The court's factual findings can, 
therefore, be challenged now, whether or not they were challenged below. The factual 
issues in question are: 
(7) Whether Daniel Armstrong's self-serving testimony, unsupported by any 
medical evidence and in fact refuted by the medical evidence, that the 
accident aggravated a pre-existing back injury was sufficient to support the 
trial court's determination of his special and general damages. (Issue #3, 
Pickett's Initial Brief at p. 8); 
(8) Whether two small, almost imperceptible, scars below Jared Armstrong's 
jaw-line constitute "permanent disfigurement" as that term is used in Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l) and, if so, whether those scars support the 
general damages awarded by the trial court. (Issue #4, Pickett's Initial Brief 
at p. 9); 
(9) Whether the opinion of Plaintiff s expert (based upon a single evaluation 
conducted over three years after the accident) that Taylor Armstrong, 
suffered a closed head injury which might impact him in the future, without 
more, was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Taylor sustained 
general damages of $350,000, or whether that amount is speculative and 
based on conjecture in light of testimony from the expert that he could not 
say with any degree of medical certainty what the impact of that head injury 
would or might be on Taylor. (Issue #5, Pickett's Initial Brief at p. 10) 
Because these issues are all challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, Pickett's 
objection below was sufficient to preserve them for appeal. 
B. The Issue of Daniel Armstrong's Standing to Sue for Damage to 
Personal Property He Did Not Own Was Appropriately Raised 
Below 
At the Hearing, Pickett's counsel objected to the submission of any testimony 
regarding the value of Lorene Armstrong's vehicle because Daniel Armstrong did not have 
any ownership interest in the vehicle and because that loss had already been paid for by 
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insurance. (R. 578 Transcript, p. 41).2 In spite of Pickett's objection, the trial judge 
received evidence of the value of the vehicle. Additional evidence elicited during the 
hearing confirmed that the vehicle was owned solely by Ms. Armstrong, and that USF&G 
and Atlanta Casualty had already compensated them for the loss of the vehicle. (R. 578 
Transcript, pp. 48-49.) Pickett's opposition to Daniel Armstrong's recovery for damage to 
property he did not own was also contained in his Damages Briefs at R. 287 and R. 535, 
(copies of which are attached hereto (without exhibits) as Addendum A). 
C. The Issue of Pickett's Immunity from Some of Plaintiffs Tort 
Claims Was Also Properly Preserved on Appeal 
Pickett's second issue (whether Utah Code Ann. §31 A-22-309(l) provided him with 
partial tort immunity) was also preserved for appeal at the outset of the Damages Hearing 
of October 16, 2000. At the Hearing, the issue of the PIP threshold immunity from some 
tort claims was dealt with in detail. (R. 578 Transcript, pp. 6-19; copies of those Transcript 
pages are attached hereto as Addendum B). Following a detailed and extensive argument, 
Judge Wilkinson ruled that the partial tort immunity provided by 31 A-22-309(l) was an 
affirmative defense rather than a threshold isssue and that Pickett's default precluded him 
from enjoying any such immunity. (R. 578 Transcript pp. 6-19) Because the trial court 
ruled from the bench on this issue there should be no question that it was before the court's 
2A transcript of the proceedings of the October 16th, 2001, Damages Hearing 
("Damages Hearing") is included in the Record starting at p. 578 and the references to that 
transcript will, hereinafter, be referred to as "R. 578 Transcript" followed by references to 
specific page numbers. 
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consciousness. (SeeR. 578, pg 19, where the trial judge stated, "if you take it up on appeal, 
then maybe you'll find out I'm wrong"). 
The Armstrongs' argument that these issues were only raised "tangentially" at trial 
(see Appellee's Brief, p. 14), is therefore without merit. Pickett's first and second issues 
were raised in a timely fashion, and were brought to the trial court's attention. Because 
Pickett met the Hart standard with respect to both issues, his appeal of such issues was 
properly taken. 
EL THE THRESHOLD LIMITATIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-
22-309(1) ARE JURISDICTIONAL. AND APPLY EVEN THOUGH 
PICKETT'S ANSWER WAS STRICKEN 
The Armstrongs argue that the threshold limitations of the PIP statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-22-309(l)(a)(I) — (v), are merely affirmative defenses. The specific threshold 
requirements at issue, however, are prefaced by the following language: 
(a) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a 
policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause 
of action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to 
have been caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has 
sustained one or more of the following: . . . 
(i) death; 
(ii) dismemberment; 
(iii) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective 
findings; 
(iv) permanent disfigurement; or 
(v) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309(l) (emphasis added). That statutory prohibition against the 
pursuit of general damages in some circumstances should be strictly enforced. 
The prohibition against maintaining a cause of action in the absence of meeting one 
of the damages thresholds is essentially jurisdictional. A claim for which the court lacks 
jurisdiction should be dismissed and should not be entertained. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h) states 
that "whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." This Court has 
repeatedly recognized that the Utah PIP Statute provides a complete bar to the pursuit of 
some claims. In Allstate v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980) this Court stated that the 
"injured party is precluded from maintaining an action to recover general damages. . . 
except where the threshold requirement of Section 9(1) are met. . . 
if a party has the security required under Section 5, the no-fault insurance act 
confers two privileges: first, he is granted partial tort immunity; second, he is 
not personally6 liable for the benefits provided under Section 6. He does, 
however, remain liable for customary tort claims, viz., general damages and 
economic losses not compensated by the benefits paid under Section 6, 
where the threshold provisions of Section 9(1) are met. 
Id. at 1200. (Emphasis added) 
That case also states that "under Section 9(1) and (2), the tort-feasor [in this case 
Pickett] has partial immunity for general damages UNTIL the threshold provisions are met 
. . . ." A/, at 1201. (Emphasis added) This court did not hold that the immunity exists only 
if pleaded, or that the partial tort immunity granted by Utah's no-fault law had to be pleaded 
before it became effective. This Court's statement that individuals are precluded from 
pursuing claims for general damages until the threshold requirements are met should be 
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enforced in every case, not just where it may be pleaded. The Court must give due regard to 
its statement in Allstate that "under the Utah No-Fault Insurance Act, the tort-feasor who 
has the required security, is not personally liable to the injured person for payment of 
Section 6 benefits." Id. at 1202-03. 
When the PIP threshold limitations issue was raised at the Damages Hearing, it was 
argued that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter a judgment for general damages 
unless each plaintiff could show he had met at least one of the enumerated thresholds. The 
trial court therefore erred by entering a judgment for general damages after the Armstrongs 
failed to produce evidence demonstrating they had met the threshold requirements of 
Utah's PIP Statutes. 
The threshold requirements of Utah's PIP Statues, unlike the statutes relied upon in 
the Armstrongs' Brief, deal with the magnitude of damages. Allegations regarding the 
amount of damage claimed by a plaintiff are never deemed admitted based on a 
defendant's failure to deny the amount in his answer. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(d); Taylor v. 
United States, 821 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a statutory damage cap is not an 
affirmative defense under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8). Plaintiffs must, therefore, demonstrate they 
have met the threshold requirements before they can pursue a claim for general damages. 
Because the amount of damage, or severity of the injury, is the central theme of Utah's PIP 
threshold limitations, it is not an affirmative defense that needs to be raised in a defendant's 
answer. 
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In Taylor, the court considered whether California Civil Code § 3333.2, as 
incorporated by the Federal Tort Claims Act, was an affirmative defense that was waived by 
the government when it failed to raise the statute in its answer. The California statute 
limited the amount of general damages a plaintiff could recover against a health care 
provider to $250,000 in actions sounding in professional negligence. In Taylor, the 
plaintiff argued that a government-owned hospital, which did not contest liability in a 
medical tort claim case, had waived the protection of § 3333.2 by failing to raise it in its 
answer. See Taylor, 821 F. 2d at 1432. 
Rejecting this argument, the Taylor court distinguished between affirmative 
defenses and statutes that limit damages, stating "[i]f the Federal Rules do not require 
plaintiffs to plead the extent of damages sought, defendants should not be required to plead 
the limitation of damages prescribed by § 3333.2." Id. at 1433. The court went on to note 
that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d) [which is similar to Utah R. Civ. P. 8(d)] "specifies that averments 
as to the amount of damage which a defendant does not deny in his answer are not deemed 
admitted." Id. 
The PIP thresholds involved in this case relate to the amount of the Armstrongs' 
damages (namely, the seriousness of the injuries and/or the amount of the medical bills), 
and serve to limit a plaintiffs damages regardless of the status of Pickett's Answer. Using 
the analysis of Taylor, Utah's PIP threshold requirements would only be affirmative 
defenses if the Armstrongs were required by the Rules of Civil Procedure to allege the 
amount of their damages and such averments had to be affirmatively denied. Because 
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Pickett was not ever required, under Utah R. Civ. P. 8(d), to challenge the alleged severity 
of the Armstrongs' injuries in his answer, he should not similarly be required to invoke the 
PIP thresholds of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l) as an affirmative defense in order to be 
protected by them. The trial court's decision in this case should have been limited by the 
requirements of Utah's PIP Statute. 
Even if this Court decides that the PIP thresholds are an affirmative defense, public 
policy considerations should excuse Atlanta Casualty, Pickett's insurer, from being bound 
by the striking of Pickett's pleadings for his failure to cooperate in defense of his case. 
Affirmative defenses must be timely pleaded to avoid the potential for prejudice and unfair 
surprise to the plaintiff. See Sanderson-Cruz v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 2d 388, 391 (E. 
D. Perm. 2000) (holding that Pennsylvania's PIP threshold statute was an affirmative 
defense that the government was required to raise in answer to auto accident claim). As the 
Sanderson court noted, "the fact that a defendant can only learn whether the limited tort 
defense is available after doing some initial discovery weighs against treating the limited 
tort defense as an affirmative defense." See Sanderson-Cruz, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 391, n.3. 
In this case, the Armstrongs' counsel was well aware that, although Pickett had been 
defaulted for his failure to participate in discovery, Pickett's insurer, Atlanta Casualty, was 
still involved in the case for the purpose of contesting the amount of damages. Allowing 
the threshold limitations to be raised as a defense at the Damages Hearing did not result in 
any prejudice or unfair surprise. The existence of the PIP threshold limitations simply 
requires evidence that they have been met before general damages can be awarded. The 
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failure to produce such evidence does nothing more than deprive Plaintiffs of damages they 
are not entitled to receive anyway. 
As the transcript of the Damages Hearing reflects, counsel for the Armstrongs was 
prepared to meet the challenge of the PIP thresholds presented by Pickett's arguments, and 
in fact persuaded the trial judge that the thresholds did not apply. The Armstrongs therefore 
suffered no prejudice by the invocation of the PIP thresholds at the Damages Hearing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-303(6) precludes an insurer from avoiding liability to a 
third party (up to its policy limits) for its insured's lack of cooperation, unless it can 
demonstrate there is collusion between the insured and the claimant. Furthermore, subpart 
5 of that Section imposes a duty upon insurers to defend their insureds in good faith 
"against any claim or suit seeking damages which would be payable under the policy." Id. 
While insurers are statutorily obligated to defend their insureds against all claims, and pay 
up to their policy limits, irrespective of their insured's willingness to assist them, they 
should not be saddled with the additional burden of being deprived of the threshold 
requirements of the PIP Statutes when their insureds refuse or fail to cooperate in a case. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-l-102 states that Utah's Insurance Code (Title § 31A 
Chapters 1 through 35) was passed to "ensure that policyholders, claimants, and insurers 
are treated fairly and equitably," Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-1-102(2), and Utah's insurance 
laws must be "liberally construed" to achieve that purpose, Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-l-
201(1). It would be patently unfair to allow one insurer or insured to be protected from 
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claims for general damages in some cases while another insurer or insured is exposed to 
such damages, even when it did nothing wrong. 
In this case, Pickett's counsel made every reasonable effort to secure Pickett's 
cooperation in defending this suit, and to avoid a default judgment. Taking the protections 
provided by the PIP thresholds away from Atlanta Casualty would not only punish Atlanta 
Casualty for something over which it had no control (i.e. Pickett's failure to cooperate), but 
it would also undermine the goals championed by the Utah Legislature in enacting the 
insurance statutes. The no-fault statutes in particular were enacted to stem the rising costs 
of automobile accident insurance and provide for the efficient resolution of claims 
involving small damages. Neither goal would be advanced by eliminating the threshold 
protection which the legislature has created. Both goals, in fact, would be harmed by 
making the no-fault threshold requirements an affirmative defense. 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's ruling that the threshold limitations of 
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309(l) provide an affirmative defense that was waived by the 
striking of Pickett's pleadings should be reversed. As a consequence, the awards for 
general damages to Daniel, Jared and Taylor Armstrong should be reversed as well because 
they failed to meet the threshold requirements when they fail to produce admissible 
evidence of permanent impairment, permanent disfigurement, or medical expenses in 
excess of $3000 as required by the statute. 
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IV. PICKETT STIPULATED TO THE ADMISSION OF PLAINTIFFS' 
EXHIBITS AS TO FORM AND FOUNDATION, BUT RESERVED 
OBJECTIONS ON ANY OTHER GROUNDS 
The Armstrongs claim that Pickett stipulated wholesale to the admission of all of 
the Armstrongs' Exhibits, contained in a black binder marked "Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1." That 
misconstrues the agreement. The true nature of the stipulation regarding the admission of 
the exhibits was discussed at the Damages Hearing of October 16, 2000, where counsel for 
Pickett stated "we've stipulated to everything. At least, we're not going to object to the 
form and foundation of anything . . . ." R. 578 at pg. 21. 
Counsel for the Armstrongs raised no objection to this statement, which clearly 
reserved Pickett's right to object to any portion of the exhibits on any other ground. In 
essence, Pickett's counsel extended a time, effort and expense-saving favor to the 
Armstrongs and the trial court by agreeing not to require the authentication of every 
document the Armstrongs wished to introduce. The Armstrongs now wish to turn that 
courtesy into a reason to recover inflated and non-recoverable damages by arguing that the 
trial court could rely on any evidence contained in "Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1," whether or not 
such evidence was admissible, relevant or actually introduced at trial or through the briefing 
process. 
All objections raised by Pickett during the Damages Hearing, and in Pickett's 
Damages Briefs that do not relate to form or foundation of the exhibits should have been 
considered by the trial court. The trial court's consideration of any inadmissible evidence 
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that was objected to by Pickett, or which was not properly introduced at trial, is therefore 
properly appealable. 
V. PICKETT ADEQUATELY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE THAT 
SUPPORTED THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS 
The Armstrongs misconstrue the nature of Pickett's burden to the marshal the 
evidence on appeal. That burden has been clearly articulated. This Court has instructed that 
"[t]o successfully challenge a trial couifs findings of fact on appeal, c[a]n appellant must 
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear 
weight of the evidence," thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 
961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). 
Pickett does not have to marshal evidence in support of findings that are not 
challenged on appeal. Nevertheless, in support of the claim that Pickett failed to marshal 
the evidence, the Armstrongs photocopied the entire trial exhibit book (well over seven 
hundred pages of material) and declared that it is fatter than Pickett's Addenda, Volume 2 
(containing all the evidence marshaled by Pickett). From this, the Armstrongs conclude 
that Pickett has failed to marshal all the evidence that supported the trial court's 
determinations. 
The Armstrongs, however, have failed to identify, with particularity, a single scrap 
of unmarshaled evidence which provides support for any of the trial court's findings 
challenged by Pickett. In order to demonstrate that Pickett failed to marshal all the 
evidence the Armstrongs must perform two simple steps. First, identify a challenged 
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finding; and second, present, at a minimum, some additional evidence that Pickett failed to 
produce that supports that particular finding. Instead, the Armstrongs ask the Court to wade 
through over seven hundred pages of evidence that may or may not be relevant to any of the 
findings that Pickett has challenged, and then compare that to the evidence marshaled by 
Pickett. In doing so, the Armstrongs have failed to provide the Court with any meaningful 
assistance in understanding their allegation that the evidence has not been marshaled, nor 
have they provided Pickett with a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that the allegedly 
missing evidence WAS appropriately marshaled. 
The Armstrongs have not demonstrated that the evidence marshaled by Pickett is 
incomplete. Instead, they seek to have this Court carry that burden, by sifting through the 
record and, on its own, identify what Pickett has omitted. Because the Armstrongs' 
assertion that Pickett failed to marshal all the evidence is not properly supported it should 
not be considered by this Court. 
VI. THE ARMSTRONGS FAILED TO MEET THE NO-FAULT 
THRESHOLDS 
Because Jared and Daniel Armstrong did not meet the threshold limitations of Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l) by showing permanent impairment or permanent 
disfigurement, it was improper for the trial court to award them general damages. 
A. Jared Armstrong's Scars Did Not Meet the Statutory Threshold 
Point VI(A)(1) of the Armstrongs' argument, regarding whether Jared Armstrong's 
scars are "permanently disfiguring" as required by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l), does 
not respond in any meaningful way to Pickett's Brief. The Armstrongs cite one dictionary 
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dictionary definition and assert, without support, that "Jared and his mother both described 
the scars as disfiguring." 
When asked, in his deposition, how the scars affected him, Jared testified "I just 
look in the mirror and I see them, and I wish they weren't there." See Pickett's Addendum, 
Tab B-3, pg. 8. The medical records of Dr. Jed Bindrup refer to Jared's complaint, in 1995, 
that the scars looked like "big zits." Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 at 140.3 Nowhere in the record 
did Jared, or his mother, specifically describe the scars as "disfiguring." 
Moreover, Jared's and his mother's opinion of the scars are not determinative; 
rather, the plain language of the statute is controlling. A determination of whether the scars 
are "permanently disfiguring" is simply a matter of applying the statute to the facts. The 
best illustration of those facts, and the only ones before the trial court since Jared did not 
testify, can be found in two photographs found in the record at Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, pg. 148 
and a third photograph at Exhibit 1 to Jared Armstrong's Telephone Deposition, beginning 
at Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab U. The first two photographs show barely perceptible scars 
along Jared's left jaw line. For this picture, Jared was required to tilt his head and the 
camera angle is from below to emphasize the markings. Similarly, the third and more 
3While Pickett's initial Brief does refer to pp. 137-140 of Plaintiff s Exhibit 1 as 
portions of the record that support the trial court's judgment, (see Pickett's Brief at pg. 19, 
f 17(a)) these pages were inadvertently left out of Pickett's Addenda, Vol. 2. Pages 137-
140 of Plaintiff s Exhibit 1 contain medical records regarding Jared's scars. The 
photographic exhibit to the Telephone Deposition of Jared Armstrong, found at Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 1, Tab U, was also referred to in Pickett's initial Brief but was also inadvertently 
omitted from the Addenda (see Pickett's Brief at pg. 19, f 15 and pg. 39). In order to 
facilitate this Court's review of the evidence we have included the missing pages with this 
Reply Brief as Addendum C. 
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recent photograph shows the skin stretched above the jaw line, which emphasizes and 
broadens scars that would ordinarily not be visible. Neither of these photographs was taken 
with Jared in a natural posture or from a natural viewer's perspective. 
These minor injuries are not the type of injuries the legislature envisioned when it 
used the language "permanent disfigurement." This appears especially so, given the context 
of the statute, which speaks of dismemberment and death in the same section. The trial 
court therefore erred as a matter of law when it awarded Jared general damages for this 
injury. 
B. Pickett's Counsel Did Not "Acknowledge" That Jared's Scarring 
Met the Threshold of Permanent Disfigurement 
In light of the general argument presented by Pickett's counsel that the threshold 
limitations of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-109(l) were a bar to the Armstrongs' claims for 
general damages and the trial court's prior ruling on that issue, it cannot be properly said 
that Pickett's counsel "acknowledged" Jared had met the threshold. (R. 578, pp. 5-19.) The 
broader issue of whether the thresholds described in subsections (i)-(v) of the statue apply 
to this case encompasses the specific issue of whether Jared's scarring constituted a 
"permanent disfigurement" under § 31A-22-309(l)(d). Because the trial judge ruled, 
generally, that the threshold limitations were an affirmative defense that had been waived by 
Pickett's default, Pickett's counsel was not required to raise, as a separate issue, each 
particular threshold described by the statute. It was sufficient, for purposes of this appeal, 
that the general issue was raised and resolved by the trial court. 
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C. Daniel Armstrong's Back Injury Did Not Meet Any of the Threshold 
Requirements of Utah Code Ann. S 31A-22-309(n 
Daniel Armstrong could have met the threshold requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-22-309(l) in either of two ways. First, he could have shown that, under subsection 
(v), he had medical expenses in excess of $3,000 as a result of the accident. Second, he 
could have shown that, under subsection (iii), he incurred "permanent disability or 
permanent impairment based upon objective findings." Daniel Armstrong, however, did 
neither. 
The Armstrongs' Brief sustained medical expenses arising from the accident of at 
least $3,823.00. See Armstrong Brief at 23. According to the trial court's Findings, 
however, which were drafted by the Armstrong's own counsel, "Daniel sustained a total of 
$2,884.97 in special damages relating to medical treatment of injuries resulting from the 
collision."4 R. 552 (Pickett's Addenda, Vol. 1, Tab J). Because the Armstrongs have not 
cross-appealed and challenged this finding, this figure has crystallized and cannot now be 
challenged. Daniel Armstrong therefore failed to meet the threshold of § 31A-22-
309(l)(e), requiring medical expenses in excess of $3,000. 
4It is also insightful to note that the $2,884.97 figure arrived at by the trial court 
included $1,073.00 for a leather executive chair with lumbar support that Daniel Armstrong 
claimed to have purchased based upon the inadmissible hearsay testimony of a chiropractor 
who did not even treat him or see him for any injury related to or arising from this accident, 
[R. at 286, 526, 548] and $1,071.22 for a CT-Scan from LDS Hospital performed over 22 
months after the accident for "back pains down the right leg, moderate for one year," (10 
months after this accident) without any evidence to support a finding that the CT-Scan was 
necessary or reasonable because of the accident [R. 286 and p. 103 of Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
D.] 
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Also in their Brief, the Armstrongs claim that "while Dan Armstrong did not have a 
physician testify that he suffered a specific percentage impairment. . . there was 
nonetheless objective testimony of his permanent impairment." See Armstrong Brief at 23 
(emphasis added). However, "permanent impairment based upon objective findings" is 
statutory language. "Objective findings," of impairment, for purposes of the statute, has 
been interpreted by the Utah Court of Appeals to mean the professional opinion of a 
physician. See McNair v. Farris, 944 P.2d 392, 395-96 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (affirming 
summary judgment for defendant in an auto accident case where plaintiff had failed to 
secure the opinion of a doctor that he was permanently disabled or impaired as required by 
§31A-22-309(l)(c)). 
Nowhere in the record is there any testimony, affidavit, or even a deposition of a 
physician, or anyone else for that matter, offering an opinion as to the permanency of 
Daniel Armstrong's back condition, let alone any evidence of objective findings of a 
permanent impairment. The record does not contain any medical charts or records that 
show Daniel has experienced back pain because of this accident. By his own admission, 
however, it is clear that Daniel had a history of back trouble before his accident with 
Pickett. How much of Daniel's back pain is attributable to the January 1996 accident 
involving Pickett and how much of it is attributable to other causes is thus a complex 
medical question. No expert opinion was offered to show that Daniel's condition was in 
fact worse after the January 1996 accident, or that any worsening of Daniel's condition was 
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. i l lnlniti ihlc lo llliuil <iccnlrnl III .MIS IhenM'orc, I T P H Ini tin1' trial no'inl lo .iv\„ii'ijl h n m c l a ir 
g e n e r a l d a m a g e s for th i s inji try. 
VH. THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENTS WERE EXCESSIVE AND NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
I he a/v'i ai ds t ;:: sach ::»f tl le ^\ i i i: istrongs w ei e all excessiv e and shoi lid be re\ isited 
because they w ere not supported by the admissible evidence before the trial court. 
Moreover, the property damage award to Daniel Armstrong for the loss wl I orene 
Nrnistnin^ s pi I lonal pmpi \\\ <• i impinpri h\ an r hi lid mil In p 11 nil m< inn'stup 
interest in that property. 
A. Taylor Armstrong's Personal Injury Judgment 
arguments regarding the insufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment amounts. 
Ihere was no expert opinioi that, to a reasonable modi, a! probability, i aylor's concussion 
would limit his =uu^.i ... •. , . a i v; JII impact'him : .* neaninglul wavs I lie 
portion of the i jrrtent awarding ] yiur Armstrong general damages of $350,000, was, 
therefore, impermissibly ba^ed upon speculation and conjecture. I he Armstrongs respond 
with the mere assertion that I a> lor' s 11 lji 11 ) ("*""a 1: 1 lild c o n c u s s i o n > is inc type 01 miur> ;:ia; 
- -nnnumer- 1 ^' *" a* :~ ^*] 
The Armstrongs do not even challenge the tact that i >* J.uier's deposition 
testimony discussed only the kinds> ^ SMUDICII^ that children with sinuiai injuries, as a 
111 u 111 1 .in cxpniem v in Ihr hiltm ^ hrn <|iit timinl ilnnil I islur sptvifn/al!« IIMMI I 
Dr. Bigier would not or could not testify about the likely effects of Taylor's inji lry on him. 
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See Pickett's Brief at 42-43. In light of Dr. Bigler's unwillingness to provide expert 
opinion about the extent of Taylor's injuries or his future limitations, the trial court's 
finding of a limitation and the consequent award of general damages was clearly erroneous, 
and the general damage award of $350,000 for Taylor should be overturned. 
B. Jared Armstrong's Personal Injury Judgment 
With regard to Jared's scars, the photographs in the record clearly show that both 
before and after his surgery, they are scarcely visible unless his skin is pulled up over the 
jaw line or the scars are viewed from obscure angles. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, pg. 148 and 
Exhibit 1 of Jared Armstrong's Telephone Deposition, at Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Tab U. 
Moreover, Jared's only testimony regarding the impact of those scars upon his life was that 
he "wish[es] they weren't there." See Pickett's Addendum, Tab B-3, pg. 8. The $10,000 
judgment for general damages for that minimal scarring was not supported by substantial 
evidence, is clearly erroneous and should be overturned. 
C. Daniel Armstrong's Personal Injury Judgment 
With regard to Daniel Armstrong's back injury, there was no substantial evidence 
connecting the January 1996 accident to Daniel's current complaints. As stated in Point 
VI(C) above, there was no expert medical testimony of permanent impairment to support 
Daniel's subjective testimony, and there was absolutely no admissible evidence that the 
January 1996 accident was responsible for any aggravation of his pre-existing back pain. 
The $10,000 award to him, was therefore, clearly erroneous and should also be set aside. 
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D. Daniel Armsuuujg b rroperty Judgment for His Wife's 
Automobile 
Finally, the award to Daniel Armstrong for damages to his wife's car should be 
overturned because he did not have an ownership interest in it [Plaintiffs Exhibit • :: 4] 
mil In i .ujse In uliull mi il |iii i lliiiii iii\ fnnt(Kji(y ilaniaucs iiii lir, t ninpllaitil Llum I I n^l'it 
to transfer or encumber the vehicle because he did not have title to it. Because he had no 
property right in the vehicle, it follows that he was not entitled to sue for damages to it, 
I he Armstrongs eile \tiish i \Lush, M ' { I1 \J " # S S i I l| ili ( | \\^ \WM\ tmi the 
proposition that Lorene Armstrong's Suburban was marital property Based upon this 
notion, the> ariiue dial Daniel had a sufficient interest in the automobile, and thus standing 
to sue 1 <;.,.... i Tnwevei „ vrmstrongs provide i 10 suppc i I: foi the notion that il 
concept ui m a n i a ' ; T rvn <•'nrrMcable to this case. 
rhis is a tort case — an action at lavv — and not a proceeding in equity. The concept 
of "mas iiai piupcrtv Ad not, therefore, even appl * • ,.,«•:>;, wclinc* ;iie concept of 
niiinl.il propoil'i - nh IN Ihc . .iilt l*f - Ci ilPnUtr .lt'lnui I lir Nimstmnj's h.ne failed1 Incite 
any authority which holds that the concept of '"marital property " entitles a party to sue in the 
name of his or her spouse for damages to that spouse's separately titled property > u;or a 
m.iiil.d piopert\ vyslniii lliiki I il illi , i- IHIIM» .in \\u iiiiinnaee Insls »\i« 11 iHimse i^n1- < "<") 
manages assets that he or she brings into or acquires during the marriage." Leslie j . Hums 
et al, Family Law 330 (1006> Such assets become shared assets only when the marr~~r 
ei ids 5 ee i <:i B e c a u s e 1 eneme .iiul I hiiiiHI A i m s l i u n g i i e r e i i i . i i i i iet l . i l ilie lii i ie I 
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Suburban was damaged, and the title was in her name, the Suburban was her property and she 
was the only party entitled to sue for its loss. 
Even if we assume, for purposes of argument, that the concept of marital property 
could entitle Daniel to sue for damages to his wife's automobile, no evidence was 
presented below to show that the automobile was in fact marital property. In making an 
equitable distribution of property in divorce, courts generally award property acquired by 
one spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage to the receiving spouse. See 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 309 (Utah 1988). 
No evidence was presented below to show how Lorene Armstrong acquired title to 
her Suburban. If relatives had gifted it to her, or if she had purchased it through non-marital 
assets, the vehicle would not be marital property, and Daniel could not have any interest in 
it. Because the trial court made no findings regarding whether the Suburban was marital or 
non-marital property, it could not properly assume that it was marital property and award 
Daniel Armstrong a judgment for the loss. 
Moreover, Lorene Armstrong was not a claimant in this lawsuit as the Armstrongs 
claim. Her name was on the pleadings only in a representative capacity, as guardian ad 
litem for her son, Taylor. Thus, she was only entitled to represent his interests, not her 
own. 
Finally, the Armstrongs' Complaint did not even pray for damages to the automobile. 
See R. at 1-3. The Complaint was never amended, and Pickett's counsel objected in a 
timely manner to the introduction of any evidence regarding damages to the vehicle at the 
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R. 578, pg 41. Pickett's due process rights were violated when the trial court considered 
this evidence because he had no notice that such a claim would even be made at any x!— -
should be reversed. 
Vlll BECAUSE THE ARMSTRONGS HAVE NOT CROSS APPEALED. 
THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER 
PICKETT'S COUNSEL HAD AUTHORITY TO APPEAR 
jt j s w e j j established law that an appellee seeking to raise an issue before the 
Supi erne Court on appeal must cross appeal, or the issue *A :.V ; * V considered 
American ( o*i> , . «jnd*uun; . * ' . . . . . . . . * . JcJangd 
\ - ' • < " - > - • * ' ^tah 1982). 
Nevertheless, the Armstrongs wish to raise the issue of whether Pickett'' s counsel 
had authority to appear in the trial court on Pickat ^ oo,dii Moreover ... Xrmstrongs 
atten lpt t :) i: ais 2 tl: lis issi le v - • ' I le * as 
preserved. They claim that they filed a motion under Ltali Code Ann. J " S o l - J J , 
requesting that Pickett's counsel give proof of his authority to appear, The alleged motion, 
l iuMU'vci <ioe,s in mi t(»pt\ti i l l I In in n i l i. I i rn 1 flu* ^ i Urdu ni!1 i Limn in i pp iMfs lK ' i |i 
1], and, with the exception of the Motion to dismiss the Appeal on those grounds tiled with 
this Court, Pickett cannot find such a n lotion elsewhere in the record, 
Additional I >, counsel Urn the Aniistiongs concednl il I In.1 ( k'lul UM IH J'THini 
Damages Hearing, that Pickett's attorne> could defend the case as far as the extent oi 
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damages was concerned. (SeeR. 578, at pg. 9, where counsel for the Armstrongs stated, "if 
he has some argument that the medical expenses are too high, or if he has some argument 
that Taylor Armstrong, you know, doesn't suffer a brain injury, then certainly he's entitled 
to put that on.") The Armstrongs are thus not entitled to raise the issue now, and this Court 
should decline to consider it. 
CONCLUSION 
Pickett adequately preserved the legal issues of: (1) whether Daniel Armstrong was 
entitled to a judgment for property damage to property he did not own; and (2) whether 
Pickett and/or his insurer were entitled to any of the protections afforded by Utah's no-
fault statutes for this appeal. Because he did not have to take any steps to preserve his right 
to challenge the factual findings of the trial court in a case tried before the bench, the 
appealed factual determinations are also properly before this Court. Additionally, Pickett 
appropriately marshaled all of the evidence which supported the challenged factual 
determinations. The Armstrongs failed to point to any specific supportive evidence in the 
records that was not marshaled by Pickett. Therefore, the factual determinations and 
sufficiency of the evidence are also appropriately before this Court. 
Pickett's stipulation as to the form and foundation of the Armstrong's proposed 
exhibits did not equate to a stipulation as to the admissibility or weight of any of the 
evidence. 
Public policy, fairness to insureds and insurance companies, well-established case 
law, the plain language of the statute and the purpose of Utah's no-fault law, all indicate that 
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the threshold requirements of Utah Code Anno. §31A-22-309(l) prevent a cause of action 
from arising until or unless those threshold requirements are met Therefore, even in light 
of Pickett's default, it was inappropriate toi tin: inu! court to award the Armstrongs any 
.itii4Mnil lui giinnal iliiiiiii^cs whni llirir \\ ,is not siillu unit admissible evidence to e stablish 
that they met those threshold requirements. 
Even if the threshold requirements do not bar the Armstrong's claims for general 
I'Liiiiagrs in (lui i asi1 IIIIR' damages i^.inlnj h\ lln iliii ill i null " nc rlcaiiv i*HTssn« in light 
of the admissible evidence presented at the hearing and in the parties' Damages Briefs. 
r>n (he forgoing reasons, and the reasons set forth in Pickett's Initial Brief +hc 
determination of damages based upon the evidence before this Court. 
R ESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /".;*da> of January. 2002. 
Attorney £-* \rv-.* '-w* n L i " ( • 
Steven B. Smith 
-27-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this / 4 day of January, 2002, two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT was served upon counsel of record by 
depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Robert H. Wilde, No. 3466 
Wilde & Associates 
935 East South Union Avenue, Suite D102 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
gftC\AXk <'* • L 
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Tab A 
A A '92 Chevrolet Suburban. 
Q AJL± riyni, wuaiO v * :"-• * ' Tab J' of Exhibit 1, 
Exhibit, ~~ D^iae ?"7>1. page stampsa .. i. 
MR. SMITH: W^'d obipct no a'.y information bei ng 
s u b m i t L e •_; . \ . , * | ,j, i | |,,,
 (1 \,, •, r e n e 
Armstrong was the owner of the vehicle at the time and the loss 
- " • ' omp^nsat" iraripp r'ompanies, and 
there's n ; a *tuai property damage lost. 
Q -  M-: >• .. *.<* Armstrong, what have you been 
compensated :oi z:\^. e^r.i^ e^." 
A r believe that r.hey sent: me a payoff which what, we 
other small check afterwards. 
Q /our1 
A I believe, ana :: . diCuiaLing, maybe about 
$ 1 8 / Q 0 Q m 
Q $18, OOO'i What was the value of the vehicle at the 
• • > 
1II1 ,MI '111 I I ,.'. I I "I,, - i - i^b' t i . ii» 1 i k s 
f o u n d a t i o n , 
1
 nHP- rr\\ JRT : Wei I , I 1 .h- \ ighl : t h a t , t h e s e a r e a l r e a d y 
stipulated • 
Mk. wiLDEi They have. 
THE COURT: That/ s i r. ^ r ~ . 
41 
1 A Periodically. 
2 Q Okay, can you flip over to Page 545? Down to number 
3 four, medical history, is that a part you filled out? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q And is that your writing where it says some blood in 
6 urine, result severe sore throat when child? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q Okay, what about up on the next side where it says 
9 sleep rest pattern, is that your writing as well? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q And that says do you have any problems sleeping and 
12 you marked the box yes? 
13 A Yes. " 
14 Q And then you wrote back pain after three to four 
15 hours of laying? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q Can you go back to Tab A? Very first page. The 
18 owner of the vehicle damaged in this accident was Lorene 
19 Armstrong, correct? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Okay. She was the registered owner? 
22 A Yes. 
23 I Q She was the titled owner? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q Flip over to Tab J if you could. Down on the bottom 
48 
1 
1 no! . :- : u n e up from the bottom, the evaluation, it 
2 says :.:ie new evaluation on the car is $27,357.49 . 
3 A That's correct. 
4 Q And the USE "&.G was going to pay you $- ? 
5 i • A That's correct. 
6 Q Okay, < i i < 
; A I believe s<" ' v .o* certain. 
8 . Q • Okay. A; • • :ne $i8,u0u came from Atlanta Casualty? 
9 A I believe so. 
10 Q Okay, and it you flip to the Page 270 - 2'8, it's a 
11 I document prepared " i naudib i e | boLution bioup. W,i; Ih.jt 
] 2 j evaluation u i ven to yc . X.v [JSF&G? 
13 A : i 
] 4 | Q Okay, there : *- r,as equipment pacKage adjustment, 
15 I Tv * : • * . - . - } taat that reflected the 
16 stereo diiu '. :*-- ^ ti.fi ^jai^eui ' Jd f r.ns ir ^he car? 
17 A believe that included the 4-wheel drive, the 
1 8 J power do~. . , -A- J::U /.ner miners. 
19 I Q Okay, ana , * : * '-. were able to take everything 
20 
21 A !es. dome a:d v.r.\ appear to be very good after we 
22 | tor.k J U L . 
2 3 J Q If you could flip back to Exhibit R, rhese are 
?4 i Taylor's school records. Have you seen those before? 
A Yes. 
560.70, all of which have already been paid by Glen Pickett's insurer. Mr. Armstrong, therefore, 
tiould not recover any amount for general damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309. 
PROPERTY DAMAGE CLAIM 
Daniel Armstrong does not have standing to pursue a claim for property in which he does not 
ive an ownership interest. Lorene Armstrong was the registered and titled owner of the vehicle 
imaged in this accident. She, and only she, could bring a claim for property damage to that vehicle. 
Yanscript at p. 48, lines 17-24, attached hereto as Exhibit A, and the Accident Report, p. 01 of 
chibit A on file with this Court]. 
Nevertheless, even if Mr. Armstrong is entitled to pursue his wife's claim for property 
mage, he already received full and complete reimbursement from the insurance companies 
/olved in this accident for that property damage. Allowing Mr. Armstrong to recover any 
ditional funds would result in a double recovery for the property damage sustained. Mr. 
mstrong also claims he is entitled to recover for items not included in the insurance companies' 
imates of the value of the damaged vehicle such as stereo equipment, speakers, and a television 
He, however, retrieved all of those items from his vehicle and testified that they didn't look too 
)d, but could be reutilized. [Transcript at p. 49, lines 19-22, attached hereto as Exhibit A]. He 
•uld not, therefore, recover any amount for those claimed damages. Mr. Armstrong failed to show 
t the accident in this case destroyed the extra equipment for which he now seeks reimbursement. 
thermore, because there is no logical explanation why he could not re-use the property, or 
ience produced regarding its current condition, Mr. Armstrong should not be allowed to recover 
amount on his property damage claim. 
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Armstrong woikol out belm." Jin! altri \\w ,n .KITJI .uid the only claimed difference was the frequency of 
lis work-outs. Because there is no evidence of medical necessity or reasonableness for the chair or the spa, 
and because those claimed expenses would has c IVMI u uirul w Lefli"1 tins ,u , jJmt h.id happened or not, 
lhc\ if in in LI ,, f fv awarded to Mr. Armstrong as a windfall at Mr. Pickett's expense. 
General Damages Because Mr. Armstrong's pain and suiienng *as iniinnni aim snmi \w ni, 
he should be jwanlcd a nnninul .nmiiiiil lor t?,fiIOIMI ihimaecs not to exceed $500. 
Daniel Armstrong's Property Damage Claim 
Daniel Armstrong does not have standing . • he does not have 
an, nw nershifi. interest ! orene Armstrong was the registered and titled owner of the vehicle damaged in. 
this accident. She, and only she, could bring a claim for property damage to ihai \ dm It: | i'nnscnpi it 
p o . .iic^ . : •• " • ' ibit A on file with this Court], Nevertheless, even 
ii Mr. Armstrong is entitled to pursue his wife's claim for property damage, he already recei\ed full and 
complete reimbursement from the insurance otiiip.uiu's -n v ulu .1 in mm ,ia;i«lnit fni ih.n prnpeii\ dam ibe. 
1 li.it rlaim h.is bmi fully and finally resolved between the insurers and allowing Mr. Armstrong to rec« •* cr 
any additional funds would result In a double recovery for the property damage sustained, I • 11u1 .: 
Mi, \nnstrongrelamril'IK1 Sti'1 \yx\nn liuluu.j ill lh< ' hull > »nic equipment and received the full ebi;r-oi 
value of the vehicle, he should not recover any amount for claimed "add ons." Furthermore »hr^ •« nQ 
evidentiary support IOI .he W^UW.; _ H " MIU IUI u> -he 
insufjii" i1' « tympanies in Exhibu J \ -f4 >0j 01 ;.T- Exhibit book on fre vv.ih :ms Lou ^ ' ' 
amount which is suppored by evidence is S254 ^0 fo4 a Ming * 
Jared1 Armstrong^ Claim for Scarring 
Special Damages Defendant does not dispute an\- of Jared's claimed special damages 
Nevertheless, because they were already paid iui by Ins mui IIMJM. 1 nn ,i « ml .iimnd IK K mini 10 
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TabB 
1 are no defenses, no affirmative defenses, and so accordingly, 
2 the no-fault statute it's not a defense. A causation is not a 
3 defense. We're only looking at the amounts of damages, and I 
4 have two expert witnesses here, I have a police officer and a 
5 toxicologist to establish the level that Mr. Pickett's 
6 inebriation at the time purely as that goes to allowing the 
7 Court to enter an award of punitive damages, and I think that 
8 the Court needs to have evidence on his prior alcohol related 
9 conviction and his inebriation in order to appropriately assess 
10 the level of punitive damage. 
11 But other than that, I think the Court is exactly 
12 right. That we're looking solely at the amount of damages and 
13 since this is an automobile accident and particularly as it 
14 relates to Taylor we're looking at, we're going to ask the 
15 Court for a substantial amount of general damages. There needs 
16 to be some sort of evidence that's going to allow the Court to 
17 understand what's an appropriate amount of general damages and 
18 we have the deposition which we're going to read excerpts of 
19 Dr. Bigler to address the amount of general damages. But I 
20 believe that's exactly right. Ail we're doing is looking at 
21 the amount of damages and all those other issues have been 
22 resolved by Mr. Pickett's default. 
23 MR. SMITH: Well, we disagree, Your Honor. In case of 
24 Allstate v. Ivy, Bear River v. Wall, both in the Court of 
25 Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court, it's explicitly stated that 
1 a plaintiff who has received recompense through personal injury 
2 protection benefits should not even pray for the damages for 
3 which they received from the insurance company that's 
4 protecting them at the time. They have a, that there's a, and 
5 that the statute 31A.2-309, Subsection 6 provides immunity to 
6 those individuals who sec - who provide the security necessary 
7 required by the statute and that in this case Glen Pickett 
8 provided the security required by the statute and therefore is 
9 in, he is entitled to immunity from the claims for damages 
10 represented by what was paid in PIP benefits. The PIP benefits 
11 are paid by the under, by the, by the injured parties insurance 
12 carrier and that injured parties insurance carrier has a 
13 statutory right of subrogation in arbitration, mandatory 
14 arbitration against Glen Pickett's insurance company. Those 
15 things have taken place. That it would be inequitable, it 
16 would represent a double recovery, and it would be contrary to 
17 statute and Utah law to permit them to plead for those damages, 
18 to pray for those damage, to recover those damages when that's 
19 been done one time already. 
2 0 THE COURT: Well, how do you mean it's been done one 
21 time already? 
22 MR. SMITH: USF&G, the Armstrong's insurance company 
23 has claimed -
24 THE COURT: Oh. 
25 MR. SMITH: - submitted a claim against Land Casualty 
1 and Land Casualty resolved that claim with USF&G. 
2 THE COURT: But you're just talking the PIP payments. 
3 I MR. SMITH: PIP payments, as far as PIP payments go. 
4 Correct. Then under Utah law, Glen Pickett, has immunity for 
5 any claim for damages for PIP payments, for PIP benefits that 
6 were received by the Armstrongs. 
7 THE COURT: Well, are you representing Mr. Pickett or 
8 are you representing the insurance company on their 
9 subrogation. 
10 MR. SMITH: The party's Glen Pickett. That's who's 
11 being sued in this case. 
12 THE COURT: I know the party's Glen Pickett. But 
13 answer my question. 
14 MR. SMITH: I'm representing Glen Pickett. His 
15 insurance company has retained me to protect his interests. 
16 THE COURT: Well, then you're representing the 
17 insurance company in a sub-litigation. Are you taking the 
18 position here today that you are here to, to minimize the 
19 damages in protection of the insurance company under 
20 subrogation? 
21 MR. SMITH: To minimize the damages against both Glen 
22 Pickett and the insurance -
23 THE COURT: Well -
24 MR. SMITH: - and that the insurance company would 
25 have to pay. If the insurance company could, they would have 
1 revoked coverage and they would have said under non-cooperation 
2 provision of /the policy you have no coverage, you have no right 
3 to a defense, no right to indemnification. Under Utah law 
4 that's not available, that the insurance company cannot reject 
5 coverage from the Armstrongs, because of their insured's non-
6 cooperation unless there's evidence of collusion between the 
7 insured and the claimants.. This case we don't have any 
8 evidence of collusion between Mr. Pickett and the Armstrongs. 
9 But we do believe that there's a right that Glen Pickett has to 
10 make the arguments before this Court that would reduce whatever 
11 damages he would have to pay. The insurance company has an 
12 obligation, statutory, contractual obligation to do that in 
13 defending him and that's an obligation that they've undertaken 
14 by hiring me. 
15 MR. WILDE: But that's not a reduction of damages. 
16 That's an affirmative defense. An affirmative defense like all 
17 the other aspects of Mr. Pickett's pleadings have been 
18 stricken, and so if he has some argument that the medical 
19 expenses are too high, or if he has some argument that Taylor 
20 Armstrong, you know, doesn't suffer a brain injury, then 
21 certainly he's entitled to put that on. But he's not entitled 
22 to put on any of the other affirmative defenses he would be 
23 entitled to put on. He's not entitled to address comparative 
24 negligence or, or the no-fault statute. His affirmative 
25 defenses have been stricken, and so all we're here looking for 
1 here today is the amount of the damage. 
2 THE COURT: Well, as I'm looking at this counsel, this 
3 has taken me somewhat by surprise. I, of course your pre-trial 
4 and I thought you were just going to come and of course put on 
5 evidence to damages and that was it, and but it appears it's 
6 more than that. I'm the opinion, just as I'm sitting here and 
7 listen to what you say that I think Mr. Wilde is right, that I 
8 think the affirmative defenses, as far as the liability is 
9 concerned, would not be available to the, to the defendant. 
10 I think that the defendant, counsel, is representing 
11 the insurance company of their interest under subrogation. 
12 That they're the ones that are going to have to pay this and 
13 therefore they're entitled to come out and to question and go 
14 into anything and any defenses as to damages I think they can 
15 raise. I'll, I'll, now when you say comparative, I don't know 
16 I how you're going to raise the -
17 MR. SMITH: We had not planned on raising any -
18 I THE COURT: Okay, I was going to say -
19 MR. SMITH: - in comparative. 
20 THE COURT: - get into that because I was getting 
21 ready to question. 
22 MR. SMITH: And I agree with the Court in that regard. 
23 THE COURT: That, that I think that they would be, 
24 have the right to question the witnesses and to present any, 
25 any defenses of which they could raise as far as the amount of 
10 
1 damages are concerned- Now, if I'm wrong in that I'll, I want 
2 to hear from you both right now. That's why I said Mr. Wilde, 
3 you're entitled to a jury if they're going to go into that, 
4 those matters, and to have them hear it and make that 
5 determination. 
6 MR. WILDE: If in fact we're going to go into those 
7 matters we'd like a jury. I don't think that's correct, Your 
8 Honor. The insurance company is not a party to this action. 
9 If they have provided counsel for Mr. Pickett -
10 THE COURT: Well, let me just talk to you Mr. Wilde, 
11 and I'm just ruling off the top of my head, that the insurance 
12 company is not a party to this action. Mr. Pickett, Mr. 
13 Pickett has a contract with the insurance company to represent 
14 him and to protect him. If Mr. Pickett defaults in this 
15 matter, I think the, the rights of Mr. Pickett are subrogated 
16 to the insurance company for them to come in and to protect 
17 their interest as far as this is concerned. Even though they 
18 are not a party, they are still the one that's going to be 
19 paying at least part of it, maybe all of it, as far as the 
20 amounts are concerned, and I think they can raise defenses on 
21 the question of damages under the right of subrogation. Now 
22 that's my feeling. 
23 MR. WILDE: Well, let me respond to that. Let's say 
24 that we filed the lawsuit and said Glen Pickett ran over these 
25 people and injured them and itemize the general [inaudible] of 
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1 damages and said, Let's have the Court or jury or someone 
2 identify what those damages were. And let's suppose that Mr. 
3 Pickett instead of going to his insurance company, had an 
4 insurance, forgot about the insurance, didn't realize he ought 
5 to go to the insurance company, went to someone who's going to 
6 be admitted in this session, the new admittees to the bar which 
7 are going to be sworn in on the 18th of this month, and this 
8 person looked at this and said ah, tort law. I'm gonna go in 
9 and raise the tort defenses, but did not bother to consult the 
10 insurance company. Did not bother to read the code and find 
11 out about the no-fault statute. Did not do any of those sorts 
12 of things and just showed up and argued general tort law. It's 
13 pretty clear that we're going to be entitled to get whatever 
14 damages come out of that and be able to respond to whatever 
15 affirmative defenses that person raises. 
16 Now, if in the process, Mr. Pickett did to that 
17 attorney what he's done to Mr. Smith, and failed to show up, 
18 failed to participate in his deposition and so on, then it's 
19 pretty clear that having his answer stricken, having his 
20 pleadings stricken, we're going to be able to come in here and 
21 just put on the amount of damages. 
22 Now I don't see how that differs in any fashion from 
23 where we are now, because an insurance company is not a party, 
24 and the fact that Mr. Smith is hired by the insurance company 
25 doesn't mean he can come in here and represent the insurance 
12 
1 company's interest with regards to that subrogation. He's 
2 entitled to represent Mr. Pickett's interest, and whatever 
3 problems the insurance company's have behind the scene, they're 
4 certainly entitled to address. But that doesn't mean that 
5 those defenses are still viable after the pleadings have been 
6 stricken. 
7 THE COURT: Now in your example, counsel, of course 
8 the insurance company had no knowledge, they were not brought 
9 into it and therefore, it would follow, under my thinking, the 
10 insurance company would not be liable for the amount of damages 
11 of which were awarded to you because they were never contacted, 
12 never brought into this lawsuit of which you proposed. 
13 Here the insurance company is present and they're 
14 representing their interests under the subrogation. In other 
15 words, you may ask for 50 million and, and I grant you that 
16 amount. The insurance company has a right to resist that 
17 saying look this is not a $50 million case. This is only a $1 
18 million case and put on the evidence to prove that. 
19 MR. WILDE: Well, but see, that ignores the totality 
20 of the insurance circumstances. For example, we've got Mr. 
21 Pickett here with the statutory minimum policy. That doesn't 
22 alter the fact that Mr. Armstrong has an under insured motorist 
23 policy for $300,000, and the, their -
24 THE COURT: What, what you say there is a no, 300,000? 
25 MR. WILDE: 300,000 under insured policy, so if the 
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1 Court awards a judgment against Mr. Pickett -
2 THE COURT: That's against his insurance company. 
3 MR. WILDE: That's exactly right, and his insurance 
4 company is not here today being represented for exactly the 
5 same reason that Mr. Pickett's insurance company is not here 
6 being represented because all of those claims are taken care of 
7 behind the scenes, after the fact, through inter-company 
8 arbitration insurance that they just sort out between 
9 themselves, what the subrogation rights are and who gets to pay 
10 what. 
11 If we read the pleadings from Mr. Pickett, there is 
12 no where alleged as a defense the fact that his insurance 
13 company has a right to subrogation, because they may well do 
14 that, and that's contractual right. But that doesn't fit into 
15 this tort case, and the fact that we have Mr. Pickett 
16 represented by Mr. Pickett's counsel and those cases he cited 
17 are Allstate v. Ivy and they involve insurance companies in the 
18 caption of the case, because we had individuals suing the 
19 insurance company and insurance companies suing individuals for 
20 subrogation and they certainly are big boys and they know how 
21 to do that. But that doesn't mean that Mr. Pickett is entitled 
22 to have the affirmative defense of the no-fault statute or 
23 anything else raised once his pleadings have been stricken. 
24 THE COURT: Well, I'm not saying he has the right 
25 under the no-fault statute. Well, that could go to damages I 
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1 guess, somewhat. Well let me hear from Mr. Smith, and I've 
2 been arguing your position here and I'm not, I'm not sure where 
3 we're going. 
4 MR. SMITH: May I approach the bench? 
5 THE COURT: Sure. 
6 I MR. SMITH: I'm going to refer to Page 1,200, down 
7 under Keynote number 2, and basically what this talks about is 
8 when an individual, an injured individual recovers PIP benefits 
9 from his insured, he should not even plead for those damages, 
10 and I read from that case. It says, -
11 THE COURT: Well the PIP benefits, they, they're minor 
12 though. You're arguing -
13 MR. SMITH: Correct. 
14 THE COURT: That, that to me is a minor element of 
15 this case. 
16 MR. SMITH: Well, it is. However, we believe that if 
17 they, that there's still no right to maintain a claim for 
18 general damages unless they meet the threshold requirements of 
19 the PIP statute. That's a statutory provision that exists and 
20 that it would be unjust and unfair to violate their information 
21 on statute. It's not ever, it's not listed as an affirmative 
22 defense at any point in time. It talks about what an 
23 individual's right to recover would be. We think the 
24 Armstrongs are, that the damages that would be awarded to the 
25 Armstrongs are limited by that statute. 
15 
THE COURT: And your speaking of the threshold? 
MR. SMITH: The threshold and the PIP benefits. The, 
the PIP benefits that they received. 
THE COURT: And how much is the thresh, how much, 
we've got two or three defendants here. How many defendants -
or plaintiffs, how many plaintiff is the, how many plaintiffs 
does the threshold apply to? 
MR. SMITH: I think, in this case it will only apply 
to Daniel, the father. That he did not -
THE COURT: Daniel's father? 
MR. SMITH: Daniel, the father, the father in this 
case. That the two boys, that this claim, I guess there's a 
question on whether or not Taylor has a permanent impairment, 
permanent injury, but they both received scarring and under the 
threshold requirements a permanent disfigurement is, I guess, 
then through the threshold. For Daniel, the father, however, 
he can not establish that he incurred $3,000 in necessary and 
reasonable medical expenses as a result of the accident and 
that would therefore preclude him from pursuing filing. It's 
the same reason that none of the other Armstrongs that were in 
the automobile are here in Court today. 
THE COURT: So then you are of the opinion they may 
proceed as far as their other -
MR. SMITH: Correct. 
MR. WILDE: What we anticipate is going to happen, is 
16 
1 we're gonna put on our evidence. It's gonna show what the 
2 damages are. The Court's going to look at those damages, going 
3 to give us a judgment for each of these three people. We 
4 disagree with counsel, which is not a surprise, on whether or 
5 not there is a permanent injury to, permanent impairment to 
6 Daniel Armstrong. However, -
7 THE COURT: Are you alleging there is? 
8 MR. WILDE: Excuse me? We allege there is, yes. 
9 However, -
10 THE COURT: That's a jury, would be a jury question 
11 then. 
12 MR. WILDE: That would be a jury question, but that's 
13 not a jury question because the pleadings have been stricken. 
14 All right? Now, when we get through and get a judgment awarded 
15 to each of these people, then as Allstate versus Ivy says, 
16 they're not entitled to have a double recovery for their PIP 
17 benefits. Now, the good Mr. Pickett obviously is not here and 
18 he's obviously's not going to get out a check and write us a 
19 check for whatever it is the Court awards up to the policy 
20 limits. That check is going to come from Atlantic Casualty, 
21 and Atlantic Casualty is going to be entitled to say, Gee the 
22 PIP benefits have already been paid and you're not allowed to 
23 claim those PIP benefits and we're going to agree with them and 
24 say certainly, that's correct, we're not entitled to those PIP 
25 benefits. But that doesn't mean we're not entitled to the 
17 
damages beyond the PIP benefits and it doesn't mean they're not 
entitled, they are entitled to use the no-fault statute as an 
affirmative defense because that's exactly what it is, and if 
we read the answer to the Complaint, and I haven't read it for 
a while, but I will personally guarantee you that one of the 
affirmative defenses is the no-fault statute and they're, that 
has been stricken. We're entitled to go ahead, put on evidence 
with regards to the damages, let the Court determine what the 
damages are and proceed. If they want to come back on PIP 
benefits, they're certainly entitled to do that, at that time. 
But it's not a defense here today. 
THE COURT: Well, I agree with Mr. Wilde, Mr. Smith. 
I think that they can go way beyond PIP benefits and that if a 
judgment was awarded to them then of course the PIP benefits 
would just be subtracted for the amount of their award that 
they claim. I mean from your client. 
MR. SMITH: And we don't believe that if, if the 
threshold requirements are not, are not met that they can 
proceed on a claim for general damages -
THE COURT: Well -
MR. SMITH: - position and, and to allow them to do 
so would create an incentive for anyone in an automobile 
accident to file a lawsuit just in case the person defaulted, 
whether or not they did or didn't have $3,000 in medical 
benefits, whether or not they did or didn't reach the 
18 
1 threshold. Once the default is entered then they can recover 
2 regardless, and that's the purpose that the statute was enacted 
3 to prevent. 
4 THE COURT: You may have a point, Mr. Wilde, it is a 
5 question for me to decide. We don't have a jury. As to 
6 whether the father has met the threshold, either the, in the 
7 amount of dollars or, or permanent injury. 
8 MR. WILDE: I don't think the, I don't think the issue 
9 of the threshold is an issue before the Court. That's been 
10 stricken. That's an affirmative defense. 
11 THE COURT: Well, I resolve it right now. I'm not 
12 sure whether that default - my immediate reaction, Mr. Wilde, 
13 is you're correct, but that, that, that, when he defaulted 
14 those affirmative defenses he has the right to go out the 
15 window but then the insurance company's here on a subrogation, 
16 that they have the right under that. 
17 MR. WILDE: And they may have the right to deal with 
18 subrogation -
19 THE COURT: But I would take the position, I'm going 
20 to take the position that the affirmative defenses, as far as 
21 the statute is concerned, are stricken through his default. Of 
22 course, if you take it up on appeal, then maybe you'll find out 
23 I'm wrong. Now where does that leave us? Are we ready to go, 
2 4 or do you -
25 MR. WILDE: We're ready to go. 
19 
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COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL MEDICAL- CENTER OPERATION REPORT 
SURGEON: JED R. BBJDRUP. M.D. 
PREOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: Four facial scars to the left face. 
POSTOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: Four facial scars to the left face. 
OPERATION: Revision of four facial scars to the left face. Full 
length 5.3 cm. 
Anesthesia: General with Dr. Robinson. 
INDICATIONS: The patient is a 15 year old male who was involved in a motor 
vehicle accident on January 7. 1996. He sustained multiple injuries to his face. 
These were allowed to heal without initial primary repair. He now has hyper-
trophic scars along the jaw line and the left cheek. He now presents for 
revision of these scars. 
PROCEDURE: After informed consent was obtained from the patient and his parents 
he was taken to the operating room where general endotracheal anesthesia was 
performed by the anesthesia service. The face region was then prepped with 
Betadine and draped in the usual sterile fashion. The four lesions were then 
marked and they were infiltrated with .5% Lidocaine with Epinephrine. The 
lesions were then all excised in their entirety in a lenticular fashion. They 
were passed for specimen. The skin edges were all then approximated using a 6-0 
nylon, carefully lining the edges. All wounds were then closed. The areas were 
then cleaned, Mastisol applied, followed by steri-strips. 
The patient was then awakened in the operating room and was taken to the recovery 
room in satisfactory condition. 
Again total length of repair was 5 3 cm. Sponge and needle counts were correct. 
JED R. BENDRUP. M.D. 
JRB/TL431 D: 7-18-96 T: 7-20-96 
DOC: FOPARMJ1.JRB Tape: 7021 C: 72005036 77018 3 
DIC: JED R. BENDRUP. M.D. EVD: 7-18-96 
OPERATION REPORT PT. NAME: ARMSTRONG. JERRED MR#: 72005036 
PHYSICIAN: JED R. BENDRUP. M. 
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ftfffl IHC LABORATORY SERVICES 
I H C A Serrice of Inurmountain Health Care 
Elizabeth H. Hammond, M.D. 
Chairman, Pathology Dept. 
COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL LABORATORY 
5770 South 300 East 
Murray, UT 84107 
(801)269-2730 
Name: ARMSTRONG, JARED T Case#: SC4731-96 
DOB/SEX: 07/25/1980, 15Y M 
Pat#: 
Hosp#: 958971 
Acct#: 72005036 
Loc : StTRGICAL CENTER 
Pathologist: Heinig, Donald W. M.D. 
Physician: Bindrup, Jed Reed M.D. 
Procedure Date: 7 18 96 
Accession Date: 07/18/96 
FINAL DIAGNOSIS: SKIN, FACE - SCAR. 
CODED DIAGNOSIS: 49060 
PRE-OP DIAGNOSIS: FACIAL SCARS 
TISSUE: FACIAL SCARS 
GROSS: 
Received are four ellipses of skin all measuring approximately .7 x .4 cm. 
The entire specimen is submitted. 
DH:kr 
MICRO: 
Sections of all of the skin lesions demonstrate epithelium with loss of rete 
ridges. There is dense collagen in the dermis. * Some inflammation is also present. 
DH:ml 
July 19, 1996 
<l^> 
James M, A vent, M.D. • SterlingT. Bennett. M.D. • George H. Cannon, M.D. • Bashar Dabbas, M.D. • Robert L. Flinncr, M.D. • JclTrey B. Glicdman, M.D. 
Elizabeth Hammond, M.D. • Donald W. Hcinig, M.D. • Sarah J. Ilstrup, M.D. • Todd L. Randolph, M.D. • Terry H. Rich, M.D. • James P. Seaman, M.D. • Robert L. Yowcll, M.D., Ph.! 
Signed: y^ M.D. Pathologist 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
DANIEL J. ARMSTRONG, JARED 
ARMSTRONG, TAYLOR ARMSTRONG BY 
LORENE ARMSTRONG, HIS GUARDIAN 
AD LITEM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GLEN C. 
1-5, 
PICKETT AND JOHN DOES 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 980908711 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
* * * * * 
Telephone Deposition of 
JARED TROY ARMSTRONG 
October 9, 2000 
* * * * * 
LILLIAN S. HUNSAKER, CSR 
(801) 571-1087 
Telephone deposition of JARED TROY ARMSTRONG, 
taken on behalf of Plaintiffs, at 935 East South 
Union Avenue, Suite D-102, Midvale, Utah, 
commencing at 10:10 a.m. on October 9, 2000, 
before Lillian S. Hunsaker, Certified Shorthand 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of 
Utah, pursuant to Notice. 
* * * * * 
A P P E . A R A N C . E . S . 
For the Plaintiffs: ROBERT H. WILDE 
Attorney at Law 
935 East South Union Avenue 
Suite D-102 
Midvale, UT 84047 
For the Defendants: Steven B. Smith 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys at Law 
261 East 300 South, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Also present: Daniel Jon Armstrong 
Lorene Armstrong 
L N D. E. X. 
Witness: Page 
JARED ARMSTRONG 
Examination by Mr. Wilde 4 
Examination by Mr. Smith 7 
Further Examination by Mr. Wilde 11 
EXHIBIT MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION 
Plaintiffs' Page 
1 Copy of photograph; 1 page 5 
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LILLIAN S. HUNSAKER, CSR 
(801) 571-1087 
MIDVALE. UTAH, MONDAY. OCTOBER 9. 2QQQ. 10:10 A.M., 
* * * * * 
MR. WILDE: Hi, Jared. Bob Wilde. How are 
you? 
THE WITNESS: Fine. 
MR. WILDE: As your dad says, we have got 
Steve Smith, who is the attorney for the other side, 
along with your mom and dad, and Lillian Hunsaker, who 
is the court reporter. 
THE WITNESS: All right. 
MR. WILDE: What we're going to do is put you 
under oath, and then I'm going to ask you some 
questions, and Mr. Smith will ask you some questions; 
I may ask you some more, and so on. 
We don't think this is going to take very 
long. But we do need to have you answer in English. 
Have you got a copy of that picture that you 
took for us? 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
MR. WILDE: Okay. Why don't you go ahead and 
raise your hand, and Lillian is going to swear you in. 
JARED ARMSTRONG, 
called as a witness at the request of Plaintiffs, 
having been first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
LILLIAN S. HUNSAKER, CSR 
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EXAMINATION 
BY MR, WILDE 
Q Would you tell us what your name and address 
is . 
A My name is Jared Troy Armstrong; I live at 
Avenita Cruz De Campo, Building Number 21, 5th Floor, 
Room Number A. 
Q What city is that? 
A That's Seville, in the country of Spain. 
Q How long have you been in Spain? 
A I have been in Spain for one year. 
Q How long are you planning on remaining in 
Spain? 
A For another 10 months at least. 
Q Do you recall an automobile accident that you 
were involved in? 
A I do. 
Q And you have provided us a copy of a picture 
which was recently taken? 
A I did. 
Q Where did that picture get taken? Tell us 
the circumstances under how that picture was taken. 
A I was informed by my father that I needed to 
revise some pictures of the scars from the accident. 
And I went through a professional photographer who had 
LILLIAN S. HUNSAKER, CSR 
(801} 571-inft7 
a studio here in Seville, Spain, and I asked him to 
take some close-up pictures of the scars. And he took 
several pictures; and these are the ones he gave me. 
Q And then you sent those to your father; is 
that correct? 
A I did. 
Q Now, as I look at it, it appears that what 
we're looking at is your chin and your neck on the 
left side; is that correct? 
A That's right. 
Q Okay. We're going to mark a copy of that 
picture here as an exhibit to your deposition. So 
let's take just a minute and let Lillian do that. 
(Whereupon, Plaintiffs' Exhibit Number 1 
was marked for identification.) 
Q (By Mr. Wilde) All right; we have marked a 
copy. 
These scars, where did they come from? What 
injuries caused those? 
A I believe they came from my head going 
through the side window. 
Q All right. Did you have scars or injuries to 
your face there prior to this accident? 
A I did not. 
Q What was done to make those scars look 
LILLIAN S. HUNSAKER, CSR 
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better, if anything? 
A Well, we went to the plastic surgeon who-- I 
went in for surgery by him. And, supposedly, he 
corrected the scars in the manner that he deemed fit. 
Q And, now, as we look at them, it looks to me 
like there's one that's on your left jaw, and another 
on your throat, and another that's just slightly above 
the one on the bottom of your jaw. Is that a fair 
statement? 
A That's correct. 
Q Are you aware of any other scars or injuries 
to you as a result of this accident? 
A Yes. They are very minor and not visible. 
Q Describe those for us. 
A I have two on my left arm--on my biceps--and 
they're in a similar manner and shape and color as 
these, but not as visible. 
Q What, if anything, do you recall about that 
collision that gave you the scars? 
A Well, I received a concussion, and I do not 
remember the collision in any way, shape or form. I 
remember being loaded in the ambulance, and I 
remember--slightly before the accident--traveling the 
road; but I remember nothing of the accident. 
MR. WILDE: I don't have any more questions. 
LILLIAN S. HUNSAKER, CSR 
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MR. SMITH: I have a few questions for you, 
Jared. 
THE WITNESS: All right. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SMITH: 
Q Have you done anything to prepare for this 
deposition today? 
A I have not. 
Q Other than take photographs? 
A Other than that; no. 
Q How many photographs did you have taken? 
A They took three photographs, but the 
photographer only gave me one. 
Q Okay. And that is the one you sent to your 
father? 
A That is right. 
Q Other than these scars on the left side of 
your face and neck, did you suffer any other injuries 
from this accident? 
A On the left side of my body, I received two 
cuts on my biceps — and I also recorded those scars 
just now—and other than that, just a few bruises and 
bumps; and the concussion, as I said. 
Q Okay. And you recovered from the bruises and 
bumps? 
LILLIAN S. HUNSAKER, CSR 
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A Yes, I did. 
Q Did they limit you in any way? 
A The bruises and bumps and scars, no, other 
than.... No, they did not limit me in any way. 
Q How do the scars affect you now? 
A I just look in the mirror and I see them, and 
I wish they weren't there. 
Q Is that why you had surgery? 
A That's why we had surgery. 
Q Do you have an opinion about whether or not 
that surgery helped the scarring? 
A I believe it did. Before, the scars were 
raised and inflamed. And I believe it had been almost 
a year before the surgery was performed or—at least a 
considerable amount of time--and the scars hadn't 
subsided at all, and there was swelling and so on. 
And after surgery, they were fairly flat, and they 
appear much less prominent. 
Q Do they cause any physical discomfort for 
you? 
A No, they don't. 
Q You just see them and you don't like them? 
A Yes. 
Q Do they impact shaving at all? 
A I did not hear that. 
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Q Do you have to shave? 
A Yes, I have to shave. 
Q Do they impact how you have to do that? 
A Well, I cut myself, anyway. But shaving, 
they seem to be cut in the amount of times or in the 
frequency as the rest of my face. 
Q So you don't believe they present any 
problem-- Do they present any other problems to you 
other than the fact that you don't like them? 
A No, they do not. 
Q Do you have any other scars on your body from 
any other accidents? 
A I do, but they are not related. 
Q What other scars do you have? 
A I have a scar on my forehead from when I was 
three or four. I have a scar on my lower right leg--
an A.T.V. accident--about five years ago. And a few 
other scars. On my thumb, I have about three. A bike 
accident, on my elbow, about seven years ago. 
Q Other than the surgery to revise the scars by 
Dr. Bindrup, have you had any other surgeries? 
A I did. I had my left hand--I had broke a 
bone, metacarpal--the fifth metacarpal--in a fight, 
and the doctor pinned the bone in place. 
Q Do you have any scarring from that? 
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A I do not. 
Q Any other hospitalization? Any other times 
you have been to the emergency room? 
A Apart from the other scars that I mentioned 
on my lower leg? 
Q Yes. 
A I received stitches for that. And recently; 
no. 
Q What do you mean? What is your definition of 
"recently"? 
A Well, I guess I went to the hospital a month 
or two ago for a strained wrist; but other than that, 
I haven't been in the hospital for three years--three, 
four—well, since the accident, really. 
Q You went to the emergency room after the 
accident; is that correct? 
A I did. Are you referring to that time — 
Q The traffic accident. 
A When the ambulance took us? 
Q Yes. 
Do you remember when that happened? 
A When the ambulance took us? 
Q Yes. 
A It was immediately after the accident. It 
was on January 6th, I believe. 
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And that was 1996? 
It was. 
Q What other treatment have you received 
because of injuries you received in the accident? You 
went to Dr. Bindrup for two visits? 
A Yes, I believe so. 
Q Anything else? 
A The emergency room. And that's it as far as 
seeing a physician about it. 
Q Have you ever been involved in any other 
lawsuits? 
I have not. 
MR. SMITH I think that's all I have 
FURTHER EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WILDE; 
Q Jared, this picture that you have, does that 
correctly depict the current state of your face? 
A It does. 
MR. WILDE: I don't have any other questions 
Jared, I appreciate it. Your mom and dad 
wish they could talk to you more, but they can't. 
LORENE ARMSTRONG: We love you. 
MR. WILDE: Go back to work. 
DAN ARMSTRONG: Work hard. 
THE WITNESS: All right. Will do. 
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MR. WILDE: Thanks. 
(Whereupon, the deposition proceedings were 
concluded at 10:35 a.m.) 
* * * * * 
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WITNESS CERTIFICATE 
ss . 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, JARED TROY ARMSTRONG, having been duly 
sworn, hereby attest and verify: 
That I am the witness referred to in the 
foregoing deposition and that I have read the foregoing 
testimony, making any changes/corrections I deem 
necessary, and the same truly and accurately reflects 
my testimony. 
That any changes/corrections I deem necessary 
I have made in ink on the correction sheet attached 
hereto as Page 15, giving my reasons therefor and 
affixed my initials thereto. 
JARED TROY ARMSTRONG 
Subscribed and sworn to at Salt Lake County, 
Utah, this day of 2 000. 
Notary Public 
Residing in 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, LILLIAN S. HUNSAKER, CS.R. and Notary 
Public for the State of Utah, residing in Salt Lake 
County, certify: 
That the deposition of JARED TROY ARMSTRONG 
was taken telephonically at the time and place herein 
set forth, at which time the witness was by me duly 
sworn to testify the truth* 
That the testimony of the witness and all 
objections made and all proceedings had of record at 
the time of the examination were reported by me and 
were thereafter transcribed into typewriting under my 
direction, and I hereby certify that the transcript is 
a full, true and correct record of my notes taken. 
I further certify that I am not of kin or 
otherwise associated with any of the parties herein or 
their counsel, and that I am not interested in the 
events thereof. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name 
and affixed my seal this 10th day of October 2000. 
;J:UANSHI,NSA«3* 
1 *< •*i^ y-y y*'Crmm.*x&*" w !3, 3001 
*P"* 
IAN S. HUNSAKER, Certified 
Shorthand Reporter and Notary 
Public for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah 
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